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BANKRUPTCY LAW
Michael A. Condyles*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey article reviews and analyzes legislative and judicial
developments that have occurred in bankruptcy law between April
1989 and April 1991. This article intends to alert the general prac-
titioner to significant recent developments in the bankruptcy area.
The article focuses on legislative changes that have been made to
the Bankruptcy Code and to Virginia statutory law, along with fed-
eral bankruptcy decisions issued within the Fourth Circuit. Where
appropriate, Virginia state court cases dealing with bankruptcy is-
sues are also addressed.
One of the more significant changes addressed concerns the Vir-
ginia General Assembly's redrafting of the property exemptions
available to an individual debtor who files bankruptcy in Virginia.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re
Moore1 addresses the question of whether a debtor's interest in an
ERISA-qualified pension plan is property of his bankruptcy es-
tate.2 Finally, developments affecting the treatment of a claim of a
secured creditor and a debtor's entitlement to a discharge will also
be addressed.
II. VIRGINIA PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes individual debt-
ors to exempt certain property interests from becoming assets of
the bankruptcy estate.3 The Bankruptcy Code allows a state to
"opt out" of the federal bankruptcy exemptions4 and to adopt in
* Associate, Maloney, Yeatts & Barr, a Professional Corporation, Richmond, Virginia;
B.A., 1984, James Madison University;, J.D., 1987, The T. C. Williams School of Law, Uni-
versity of Richmond. The author is a former law clerk to the Honorable Blackwell N. Shel-
ley, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond
Division.
1. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
4. Id. § 522(b)(1).
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their stead separate exemptions.5 Virginia is one of thirty-six states
which has opted out of the federal exemption scheme.' Although
the Virginia exemptions apply to debtors and non-debtors alike,
most decisions interpreting the application of the Virginia exemp-
tions have been rendered in connection with bankruptcy cases.
This is a result of the importance that exemptions play in effective
bankruptcy planning and in the administration of a bankruptcy
estate.
During the 1990 General Assembly, two bills were enacted which
significantly changed the exemptions available to an individual in
Virginia. The changes were intended to clarify and update the ex-
isting exemptions. The changes also created two additional exemp-
tions available to a debtor.
The changes adopted expand the rights of debtors at the ex-
pense of creditors. However, some of the significant loopholes that
had become notorious under the old exemptions have now been
closed. This should serve to protect creditors to a greater degree."
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990). The "opt out" provision of the Bankruptcy
Code is limited to excluding only the federal exemptions specified in § 522(d). Bass v.
Thacker, 5 Bankr. 592 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). The remaining provisions of § 522 are still
applicable to a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Boyd, 11
Bankr. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). In fact, a Virginia bankruptcy court recently ruled that
§ 522(f) can be utilized by a debtor in a Chapter 7 case to avoid a judicial lien on his
residence when there was no equity in the property. In re Gunter, 100 Bankr. 311 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1989).
6. Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Exemption Statutes to the
Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia H. Doc. No. 77 at 8 (1990) [hereinafter
REPORT]. The report lists the following states as those which have opted out: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wy-
oming. Id.
7. The expansion of a debtor's rights reflects the legislative intent that "[tihe fundamen-
tal purpose of property exemption statutes is to protect a debtor and his dependents from
absolute poverty and, in doing so, protect the state from assuming the support of debtors
and their families." Id. at 9.
8. Under the prior exemption scheme, limits were not placed on the value of such ex-
emptible items as "one horse," "rugs," or "necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and his
family." The failure to limit the value of such items created the ability to claim excessive
exemptions. For example, a $2,500.00 mink coat was found to be within the contemplation
of "all necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and his family" since the word "necessary" is
not a word of limitation requiring the fixing of a value on the items to be exempt. In re
Perry, 6 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). In addition, a racehorse whose value was
thought to be between $50,000.00 and $640,000.00 was found to be exempt under the Code
section allowing every household to exempt one horse. In re Freedlander, 93 Bankr. 446
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
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Moreover, the potential for abuse that existed under the prior pro-
visions has, for the most part, been remedied by placing monetary
limits on the categories of exempt property.
A. Exemption of Retirement Plans
A new exemption was created in 1990 for interests arising under
certain types of retirement plans.9 The portion of an individual's
interest in a retirement plan that now may be exempted is limited
to an amount that will provide the debtor with an annual benefit
not to exceed $17,500.00.10 The statute's definition of retirement
plan includes most types of qualified retirement plans and is writ-
ten broadly to include plans that were "intended" to be qualified."-
Two restrictions are interposed on the exemption in order to
prevent abuse. First, an exemption is not allowed with respect to
funds contributed to a retirement plan in the fiscal year in which
the exemption is claimed and for the two preceding fiscal years.
12
As a result, the debtor must have accumulated the monies claimed
as exempt at least three years prior to the date the exemption is
claimed. This restriction is apparently intended to prevent a
debtor from investing substantial amounts of money in a retire-
ment plan just prior to filing bankruptcy in an attempt to avoid
creditors. Second, restrictions placed on the exemption prevent
married individuals who share an interest in the same retirement
plan or plans from claiming two separate exemptions of $17,500.00,
to the extent they are jointly liable for any debts incurred during
their marriage.1 "
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
10. Id. § 34-34(C). In order to determine the amount that must be invested in order to
annually receive $17,500.00, a graduated factoring table contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 34-
34(C) must be examined. This system is intended to allow for an exemption equal to the
present value of annuity payments that will commence at age 65. Id. § 34-34(A). Based on
the graduated increases as calculated into the table, the 65 year old debtor could maintain a
retirement plan with a value of $143,426.50 and still qualify for the $17,500.00 exemption.
11. Id. § 34-34(A). The statute defines retirement plan to mean "a plan, account or ar-
rangement which is intended to satisfy the requirement of United States Internal Revenue
Code §§ 401, 403(a), 403(b), 408, 409 (as in effect prior to repeal by United States P.L. 98-
369), or § 457." Id. Each of these sections refer to qualified retirement plans. In order for a
retirement plan to be considered "qualified" certain requirements set out in the Internal
Revenue Code must be met. See infra note 60.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(D).
13. Id. § 34-34(F). The exemption for retirement accounts must be claimed within the
time limits prescribed by § 34-17 of the Code of Virginia. Section 34-17 requires that an
exemption be taken on or before the fifth day after the date initially set for the meeting of
creditors held in the bankruptcy case. Id. § 34-34(G).
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The reason the Virginia General Assembly established an ex-
emption for retirement plans was to cure an apparent inconsis-
tency in the treatment of qualified retirement plans 14 under Vir-
ginia Law. 15 Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re Moore, 6
it was believed that a qualified retirement plan could only be ex-
cluded from a debtor's bankruptcy estate if the plan met the re-
quirements of Virginia's spendthrift trust law.' 7 Virginia's spend-
thrift trust law, however, does not allow for the creation of a trust
for the benefit of the settlor (self-settling trusts). Therefore, a
qualified retirement plan created by an owner-employee or a self-
employed individual was thought not to be entitled to the same
benefit in bankruptcy that would be available to other employees.' s
In Moore, the Fourth Circuit held that the anti-alienation clause
required to be included in all qualified plans 9 was sufficient in and
of itself to exclude the plan from the bankruptcy estate.2" Yet,
since Moore does not specifically address the issue of whether a
self-settling qualified plan is excluded from the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate, the extent of the application of the court's ruling
was left uncertain. In a recent decision expanding on Moore, the
Fourth Circuit in Shumate v. Patterson2- held that an anti-aliena-
tion clause contained in a self-settling qualified plan does in fact
allow for the exclusion of the plan from the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decisions arguably make the
newly enacted retirement plan exemption irrelevant in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 22
14. See generally infra text accompanying notes 58-71.
15. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
16. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
17. REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7; see infra note 62.
18. REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-8.
19. See infra note 60.
20. See infra note 68.
21. Shumate v. Patterson, No. 88-2174 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
USAPP file). In Shumate the court states that "ERISA requires a plan to have a non-
alienation provision, and that provision has been vigorously enforced. [citations omitted] No
more inquiry need be made to determine whether the trust is controlled by the settlor or the
beneficiary, or whether they are the same person." Id.
22. However, because Virginia's retirement plan exception is written broadly to include
plans that were "intended" to be qualified, the exemption still has an application in certain
instances. VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-34(A).
[Vol. 25:607610
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B. Homestead Exemption
In addition to creating a new exemption for retirement plans,
broad changes were also made to the existing exemption scheme.
Specifically, significant changes were made to the homestead ex-
emption.23 The homestead exemption is one of the principal ex-
emptions available to debtors in Virginia. The homestead exemp-
tion gives a debtor the right to claim exempt any property, real or
personal, up to $5,000.00 in value. 4 The exemption is still availa-
ble to all householderg, as the term has been redefined,25 and may
only be claimed once in a debtor's life.2
In a significant 1990 change to the homestead exemption, a
debtor is now allowed to claim an additional $500.00 for each de-
pendent of the householder.27 The term "dependent" means an
"individual who derives support primarily from the householder
and who does not maintain sufficient assets to support himself.28
Additionally, under no circumstance may an individual be treated
as a "dependent of more than one householder. ' 2 Dependency can
be established by showing that an individual was claimed as a de-
pendent in a householder's most recent income tax return. Because
the term householder has been broadly redefined as "any resident
of Virginia," there exists the potential for litigation over the treat-
ment of a dependent as a householder.
In their amendments, the General Assembly addressed the man-
ner in which a homestead exemption can be claimed in connection
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
24. Id.
25. "[H]ouseholder" was redefined in 1990 to mean "any resident of Virginia." Id. § 34-1.
Under the prior definition, "householder" meant "any person, married or unmarried, who
maintains a separate residence or living quarters, whether or not others are living with
him." Id. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The ambiguities contained in this definition raised such
questions as whether a child living with his parents qualifies as a householder, Jones v.
Kirsch, 93 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988), or whether a husband and wife, living together,
may both be deemed householders, Roberts v. County of Henrico Fed. Credit Union, 709
F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1983); Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Thomp-
son, 4 Bankr. 823 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). Most recently, it was determined under the prior
definition that an independent child living with his parents and contributing to the mainte-
nance of the residence was a householder. In re Howell, 106 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1989).
26. In In re Hayes, 119 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990), the bankruptcy court held that
a debtor's right to claim a homestead exemption is not compromised by the trustee's estab-
lishment of the existence of the debtor's intent to defraud creditors.
27. VA. CODE. ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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with the conversion of a case from Chapters 11, 12 or 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code to a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The amendments require that the homestead exemp-
tion be claimed "on or before the fifth day after the date initially
set for the meeting" of creditors in the converted Chapter 7 case.30
This change is significant because under the prior statute a debtor
who did not claim a homestead exemption in a case originally filed
under Chapters 11, 12 or 13 lost the right to subsequently claim
the exemption in a case converted to Chapter 7.1 As a debtor in a
Chapter 11, 12 or 13 case has little incentive to be diligent in
claiming exemptions at the time the petition is filed, many debtors
lost the benefit of the homestead exemption under prior law.32
The General Assembly did not specify whether the new exemp-
tions apply to pending bankruptcy cases that were converted to
Chapter 7 after the July 1, 1990 effective date of the amendments.
However, a Virginia bankruptcy court has recently held that, in
accordance with section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
exemptions in effect at the time of the initial filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition are controlling. 33 Accordingly, a debtor who filed
for bankruptcy prior to July 1, 1990, and subsequently converted
his case to Chapter 7 after this date would not be entitled to the
benefit of the new exemption scheme.
Prior to 1990, a householder was not allowed a homestead ex-
emption against certain types of creditor's claims.3 4 Generally, the
claims of landlords, mechanics and certain other creditors were
preferred over a householder's right to claim a homestead exemp-
tion. The new legislation significantly reduces the type of creditors
that receive preferred treatment. Currently, the only creditors en-
titled to defeat a debtor's homestead exemption are those who pro-
vide purchase money financing in the acquisition of property"m and
those claiming a spousal or child support obligation.36
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17.
31. Id. § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
32. A debtor lacks the incentive to diligently claim exemptions in bankruptcy cases under
Chapters 11, 12 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code since he typically remains in possession of
his property. After a plan of reorganization is confirmed, the property of the estate vests in
the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(b), 1227(b), 1327(b) (1988).
33. See In re Stroble, 127 Bankr. 372 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991); see also In re Williamson,
804 F.2d 1355, 1359 (5th Cir. 1986).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-5(1) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
35. Id. § 34-5(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
36. Id. § 34-5(2).
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In 1990, the General Assembly also prescribed a form homestead
deed that must be substantially followed in order to claim the ex-
emption.7 The form adopted to claim a homestead exemption in
personal property is slightly different from the real property
form.38 As the provisions allow for forms that are "substantially
similar" to those suggested by the General Assembly, it should still
be an acceptable practice to use a single homestead deed which
claims as exempt both real and personal property.
C. Poor Debtor's Exemption
The amendments made to the exemption scheme include major
revisions to the poor debtor's exemption contained in section 34-26
of the Code of Virginia ("Code"). In an effort to limit the potential
for abuse, the General Assembly placed monetary 'limits on many
of the exemptions that were previously available.3 9 In amending
the poor debtor's exemption, the Virginia General Assembly relied
on the exemption scheme adopted by North Carolina.40
The poor debtor's exemption now allows a householder to claim
an exemption in property purchased with non-exempt assets in
contemplation of bankruptcy.41 This amendment clarifies a previ-
ously unsettled area of the law and allows for greater certainty
with respect to pre-bankruptcy planning.
Under the prior poor debtor's exemption, a householder was en-
titled to claim an exemption for such items as "one cow," "two
hoes," "fifty bushels of shelled corn," and "one barrel of flour."42
The new legislation modernizes the exemption to account for items
which are presently necessary to sustain daily life.43 Under section
34-26 of the Code, the new poor debtor's exemptions include the
following:
1. The exemption for the family Bible, wedding and engagement
rings and a burial lot have not been changed.
2. The exemption for "family pictures" has been changed to an
37. Id. §§ 34-6, -14 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
38. Id.
39. See supra note 8.
40. REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
42. Id. § 34-26(5) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
43. REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
1991] 613
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exemption for family portraits and family heirlooms with a value
not to exceed $5,000.00. The General Assembly omitted any defini-
tion of the term "family heirloom," therefore it will be left to the
courts to decide the kinds of property that qualify for the
exemption.45
3. The exemption for "all necessary wearing apparel of the
debtor and his family" has been limited to the wearing apparel of
the householder with a value not to exceed $1,000.00.46 This
change resolves the issue raised in In re Perry47 which held that a
fur coat valued at $2,500.00 was necessary apparel and therefore
entitled to be exempt.
4. The exemption of specific household items such as "beds,"
"bedsteads," "carpets," and "rugs" has been replaced with a much
broader exemption encompassing all household furnishings with a
value not to exceed $5,000.00. 41
5. Pets are now the only kinds of animals that are exempt under
the new poor debtor's exemption. 49 Under the prior exemption, nu-
merous farm animals which were thought to be necessary to sus-
tain a family in an agrarian society were exempt. 50 In In re Freed-
lander,51 the broad scope of the prior exemptions resulted in
exempting a racehorse with a potential value as high as
$640,000.00.
6. The former statute provided an exemption for the "tools and
utensils" used by a mechanic in his trade, and an additional ex-
emption of a boat and tackle of an oysterman or fisherman, not
exceeding $1,500.00, was also available.52 Considerable litigation
occurred with respect to the tools of trade exemption, with the pri-
mary area of dispute being the items which constituted tools of a
trade.53 In order to broaden the application of the exemption, the
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
46. Id.
47. 6 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 36-26 (Rep. Vol. 1984).
51. 93 Bankr. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
53. In determining whether or not an item constituted a tool of trade, it was found that
the items had to be reasonably necessary, both in kind and quality, for the workman to
perform his chosen trade in an efficient and competent manner. In re Allen, 52 Bankr. 206
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985). A factual determination had to be made on a'case by case basis of
whether each tool of a mechanic was actually necessary for the particular trade. In re
[Vol. 25:607
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amendments now allow for an expansive range of items that can be
claimed exempt in connection with a householder's "occupation or
trade."" The term "occupation" is defined to include students of
almost any kind, and a limit of $10,000.00 has been placed on the
value of items that can be claimed exempt."
7. Two new exemption provisions have been added to the former
statute. The first allows for the exemption of "medically prescribed
health aids;" this exemption is not limited to a monetary amount.
The second exemption applies to a motor vehicle and cannot ex-
ceed $2,000.00. A perfected security interest on the motor vehicle
will have priority over the allowed exemption. These two exemp-
tions broaden the rights of a debtor, and appear to bring Virginia's
statute more in line with the exemptions available under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
D. Exemption for Personal Injury Claims
An additional exemption created under the new exemption
scheme concerns personal injury claims. Under prior law, the
Fourth Circuit held in Tignor v. Parkinson that personal injury
claims were not exempt based on Virginia's statutory prohibition
on the assignment of tort claims. 6 As a result, personal injury
claims could only be exempted in accordance with a homestead ex-
emption. The new legislation nullifies the effect of Tignor and pro-
vides an exemption for personal injury claims without any limita-
tion as to amount.57
III. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines property of the estate to
include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." 58 Section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code excludes as property of the estate a debtor's in-
terest in certain trusts that maintain a restriction on the transfer
of an interest. Specifically, this section provides that "[a] restric-
tion on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
Quidley, 39 Bankr. 362, 367 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (RepL Vol. 1990).
55. Id.
56. 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-26 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-28.1 (Cure. Supp. 1991).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
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that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is en-
forceable in a case under this title." 9 A significant debate pres-
ently exists over the meaning of the phrase "applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law."
If read broadly, "applicable nonbankruptcy law" can be inter-
preted to include qualified retirement plans"' governed by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, commonly re-
ferred to as ERISA 1 If interpreted narrowly, however, the phrase
would apply only to spendthrift trusts62 created and enforceable in
accordance with state law. 3 Because there exists the potential for
excluding significant interests contained in a qualified retirement
plan from the definition of property of the bankruptcy estate, in
bankruptcy planning it is critical to determine the extent to which
section 541(c)(2) applies. If the interest in the plan does not be-
come property of the estate, it would not be an asset subject to
recovery and administration by a trustee. As a result, there would
59. Id. § 541(c)(2) (emphasis added).
60. "[Q]ualified retirement plan" is defined broadly in the Internal Revenue Code to in-
clude pension plans, stock bonus plans, and annuity plans. 12 Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d
(Res. Inst. Am.) I H-5101 (1991). There are certain requirements for qualification that all
qualified plans must meet. A requirement of particular significance concerns the need for an
anti-alienation clause under the plan. With certain exceptions, an anti-alienation clause
must provide that benefits under the plan may not be assigned, alienated, garnished, at-
tached or pledged as collateral for a loan. Id. T H-8200.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461 (1988). ERISA is very broad and applies to most employee
retirement plans. Id. §§ 1002(2), 1321. Congress enacted ERISA "to protect and expand the
rights of all workers to a pension." 120 CONG. REc. 29,1994 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Biaggi). ERISA itself is very complex and allows for a wide range of options for pension and
welfare benefit plans. The ERISA provisions "federalize" pension plan law by providing
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
62. Section 55-19 of the Code recognizes the validity of spendthrift trusts. Under Virginia
law, a spendthrift trust has been found to have three defining characteristics. A spendthrift
trust must (i) provide for the support and maintenance of its beneficiary; (ii) have been
intended, expressly or impliedly, by the settlor to be protected from the beneficiary's credi-
tors; and (iii) have been intended by the settlor to prevent the beneficiary's voluntary or
involuntary alienation of the trust property. Levey v. First Va. Bank, 845 F.2d 80, 82-83
(4th Cir. 1988).
63. Proponents of a narrow interpretation of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" cite the leg-
islative history of § 541(c)(2) as authority. See infra note 68. A house report notes that §
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a
spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable
state law. The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should not be permitted to defeat the
legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st sess. 176 (1977).
616
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be no need to exempt such an interest.64
In In re Moore, the Fourth Circuit adopted a broad interpreta-
tion of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law. 81 5 In so doing,
the court held that a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified re-
tirement plan was excluded as an asset of the bankruptcy estate
pursuant to the anti-alienation clause contained in the plan."6 This
decision extends the Fourth Circuit's prior ruling in In re
McClain.6
In Moore, the Fourth Circuit determined that the application of
section 541(c)(2) was not limited to state spendthrift trust law as
most courts had previously ruled.68 In holding that the clear lan-
guage of the statute controls, the Fourth Circuit rejected the reli-
ance by other courts on legislative history as authority for finding
that section 541(c)(2) applied only to state spendthrift trusts. 9
The court concluded that the security of employee retirement ben-
efits could only be ensured if there was uniform treatment of re-
tirement plans throughout the country."0 Because ERISA preempts
state law, the Fourth Circuit held that the application of the anti-
alienation provisions in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code op-
erated to provide identical treatment of benefits in all states.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Moore is significant for several
64. As discussed earlier in this article, an exemption is now available in Virginia for quali-
fied retirement plans. This exemption, however, is subject to a monetary limit. See supra
text accompanying notes 10-13.
65. 907 F.2d 1676 (4th Cir. 1990).
66. Id.
67. 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985). In In re McClain, the court found that the language of
the qualified plan restricted the transfer of the debtor's interest in the plan under state law.
See also In re Putman, 110 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
68. The majority of appellate courts have held that the anti-alienation provision of a
qualified plan does not in and of itself allow for the exclusion of a debtor's interest in the
plan from a bankruptcy estate. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983), is the earliest and
leading circuit court case on this issue. The court in Goff adopted a narrow interpretation of
the scope of § 541(c)(2) and found that the section applied only to spendthrift trusts. An
analysis of the applicable state law relevant to spendthrift trusts determined that the pen-
sion plan in question did not qualify as a spendthrift trust. Other appellate court decisions
that have adopted the court's reasoning in Goff include In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254 (7th
Cir. 1990); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
A substantial majority of lower courts have also followed the Goff rationale. See generally
Note, ERISA Preemption of State Exemption Laws: The Effects in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKU
DEV. J. 615, 616-18 (1990).
69. In re Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
70. The court stated that "[o]ur holding ensures that the security of employee retirement
benefits will not depend on the particularities of state spendthrift law." Id. at 1480.
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reasons. First, it is one of the few decisions which departs from the
traditional spendthrift trust analysis in determining whether a re-
tirement plan under section 541(c)(2) is excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate. Second, it provides debtors with greater certainty in
assessing whether a retirement plan will be treated as an asset of
their bankruptcy estate. Third, and perhaps most important, the
rationale of the Fourth Circuit's decision allows for the exclusion
of self-settling qualified plans of closely owned businesses. 71
IV. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS
Several bankruptcy decisions rendered during the survey period
affected the manner in which a secured creditor's claim will be
treated in a bankruptcy case. Of particular interest is In re Town-
side Partners Ltd.72 in which a Virginia bankruptcy court ad-
dressed the treatment of an assignment of rents clause contained
in a deed of trust. Other decisions addressed such matters as (i)
the reduction of a creditor's lien on a debtor's principal residence
in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case;73 (ii) the right of a secured credi-
tor to recover a deficiency claim against a debtor when notice of a
sale of collateral is not given;74 and (iii) a secured creditor's entitle-
ment to a priority claim when the "adequate protection" it had
been afforded proves to be insufficient.75 The following analysis re-
views the developments that have occurred in these areas.
A. Assignment of Rents
The treatment of an assignment of rents provision contained in
a deed of trust is currently a popular topic in bankruptcy law. In
71. The Fourth Circuit in Shumate v. Patterson, No. 88-2174 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, USAPP file), recently confirmed that self-settling qualified plans
of closely owned businesses are in fact excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Prior
to the court's decision in Shumate, numerous courts interpreting state spendthrift trust law
have relied on the self-settling aspect of a qualified plan as the basis for failing to exclude a
plan's interest under § 541(c)(2). In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490; In re Goff, 706 F.2d at
588-89; In re Kerr, 65 Bankr. 739, 740, 745 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re O'Brien, 50 Bankr.
67, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); and In re DiPiazza, 29 Bankr. 916, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983). In O'Brien, a Virginia bankruptcy court found that a qualified pension plan could not
be excluded from the bankruptcy estate because of the self-settling nature of the plan. The
bankruptcy court found that the plan did not qualify as a traditional spendthrift trust since
the settlor was also the beneficiary. In re O'Brien, 50 Bankr. at 77.
72. 125 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
73. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
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Virginia, as is typical in other states, the Uniform Commercial
Code does not apply to the "creation or transfer of an interest in or
lien on real estate. 7 6 As a result, a secured creditor's interest in
rents received from real estate is created by an assignment of rents
clause typically contained in a deed of trust recorded against the
property. The point at which a secured creditor becomes entitled
to receive the rents from real estate under an assignment of rents
clause is determined by state law and has been the subject of much
debate and uncertainty."
The issue of when a secured creditor becomes entitled to receive
rents from real estate is important in a bankruptcy context since
the question determines the debtor's right to use such property in
a Chapter 11 reorganization. Section 363(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides the Chapter 11 debtor with broad authority to use
property of the estate in the ordinary course of the debtor's busi-
ness.78 However, when a creditor's collateral is in the form of "cash
collateral, '79 the Bankruptcy Code provides the creditor with spe-
cial protection. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code prevents the
debtor from using cash collateral without first obtaining the credi-
tor's consent or court authority.8 0 This protection is afforded to the
creditor because allowing the debtor to use cash collateral is, in
effect, forcing the creditor to finance a Chapter 11 debtor's post-
petition operation.
In In re Townside Partners, Ltd.,81 a Virginia bankruptcy court
addressed the issue whether rents should be treated as cash collat-
eral. In Townside, the debtor acquired an apartment complex
against which a deed of trust containing an assignment of rents
clause was executed and properly recorded. The assignment of
rents clause stated that a "present and irrevocable" assignment of
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-104(j) (Repl. Vol. 1965).
77. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988) of the Bankruptcy Code defines cash collateral broadly to
mean
cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other
cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the
estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offsprings, rents, or prof-
its of property subject to a security interest as provided in section 552(b), ...
whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy
Code] ....
Id.
80. Id. § 363(c)(2).
81. 125 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
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rents was created.82 Additional language contained in the clause in-
dicated that the assignment of rents provision may be triggered
upon an event of default.
The court determined that there were two means by which rents
could qualify as cash collateral under Virginia law. The first re-
quired that the creditor be in actual possession of the property in
order to create an entitlement to the rental income.8 3 The second
required that the assignment of rents clause contain language that
establishes an "absolute" assignment of rents.8 4 In the latter case,
the court relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Fidelity Bank-
ers Life Insurance Co. v. Williams85 which recognizes the validity
and enforceability of an absolute assignment of rent clause.
In finding that a clause granting an absolute assignment of rents
was present in Townside, the court distinguished the facts of In re
Vienna Park Properties,6 a New York bankruptcy court decision
interpreting Virginia law. In that case, the New York court held
that the assignment of rents clause was not absolute since it was
granted only "as additional security. 81 7
Townside clarifies Virginia state law with respect to the treat-
ment of assignment of rent clauses in bankruptcy cases. To the
extent the decision is followed by other Virginia bankruptcy
courts, the case will provide guidance in drafting the language con-
tained in future assignment of rent clauses. The decision will also
provide practitioners, representing debtors and creditors alike,
82. Id. at 10.
83. Although rents are specifically included within the definition of cash collateral, the
definition also requires that they be "property subject to a security interest as provided in §
552(b) .... 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988). Section 552(b) requires a creditor to have a present
entitlement to rents at the time the petition is filed in order to maintain a right to the rents
post-petition. Id. § 552(b).
Because Virginia is a "lien theory" state and not a "title theory" state, secured creditor's
cases have held that an immediate entitlement to rents is created by the creditor having
actual possession of the property. Interstate R.P. Co. v. Roberts, 127 Va. 688, 692, 105 S.E.
463, 464 (1920) ("[tlhe essence of a mortgage or deed of trust is that it creates a lien on
property to secure a debt"); In re Vienna Park Properties, 120 Bankr. 332, 335-36 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990); Administrator v. Richmond & A.R.R. Co., 81 Va. 388, 391 (1866) ("The law
is now well settled that until possession of the mortgage property is taken by the mortgagee,
or proper judicial authority, the mortgagor is entitled to the profits. When possession is thus
taken, the mortgagee becomes entitled to the profits but only to such as thereafter accrue.");
In re Townside Partners, Ltd., 125 Bankr. at 10.
84. In re Townside, 125 Bankr. at 10.
85. 506 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974).
86. 120 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
87. Id. at 337.
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with the certainty needed for effective bankruptcy planning. The
holding will also have ramifications with respect to Chapter 7 pro-
ceedings in that a secured creditor, without an absolute assignment
of rents clause, will not be entitled to recover rents from real estate
until after obtaining relief from the automatic stay and taking pos-
session of the property.88
B. Lien Reduction Under Chapter 13
Several recent Virginia bankruptcy court decisions have ad-
dressed the question of whether a homeowner can use Chapter 13
to repay less than the full amount of a home mortgage. In In re
Gadson,9 the bankruptcy court held that a homeowner in a Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy case could reduce a creditor's claim secured by a
deed of trust only on the debtor's principal residence to reflect the
value of the collateral.90 The court's decision turned on a compari-
son of two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, sections 506 and
1322(b)(2).
Under section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, a secured claim can
be reduced to reflect the value of the underlying collateral. 1 The
language of section 506, however, conflicts with section 1322(b)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code which provides that a Chapter 13 plan
may not modify the rights of holders of claims secured only by a
debtor's principal residence.92 In Gadson, the court determined
that section 1322(b)(2) does not preclude a Chapter 13 debtor from
modifying the amount of a secured claim pursuant to section 506.93
88. In re Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Associates, 116 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1990), also analyzes the existence of cash collateral in an assignment of rents context. In
Oceanview, a Virginia bankruptcy court reviewed the issue of whether hotel receipts could
be considered rents under an assignment of rents clause. In finding that hotel receipts could
not be considered "rents," the court held that the creditor's lien had to be perfected as
personal property in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
89. 114 Bankr. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
90. It should be noted that although this particular issue was not decided, the bankruptcy
court in In re Schaffer, 84 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. W.D. Va.), aff'd and remanded sub nom.,
Capital Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc. v. Schaffer, 116 Bankr. 60 (W.D. Va. 1988), appeal dis-
missed, 912 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1989), took an even more restrictive view of § 1322(b)(2). In
Capital Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc., the court held that "notwithstanding the fact that the
value of the real estate may be high enough to make the debt fully secured" a Chapter 13
plan can modify the rights of a creditor secured only by a debtor's principal residence. Id. at
61. (quoting In re Schaffer, 84 Bankr. 63, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988)).
91. See United States v. Ron Pear Enter., Inc., 89 U.S. 235 (1989).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
93. In re Gadson, 114 Bankr. at 456.
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Since Gadson, two other cases, In re Moore94 and In re McNair,95
have adopted the same analysis.
The bankruptcy court's decision in Gadson produces a favorable
result for unsecured creditors and Chapter 13 debtors alike.
Monthly payments to creditors secured only by a debtor's home
can now be reduced under a Chapter 13 plan to correspond to the
secured portion of the debt. This will have the effect of increasing
the debtor's disposable income and will allow for larger payments
to unsecured creditors.9 6 By increasing the payments to unsecured
creditors, a Chapter 13 debtor will be more capable of overcoming
any "meaningful" or "substantial" payment requirement that may
be considered by a bankruptcy court in confirming the debtor's
plan.97
C. Deficiency Claims Under Flawed U.C.C. Sales
In In re Parrish,"8 a Virginia bankruptcy court determined that
a secured creditor's failure to provide proper notice of a U.C.C.
Article 9 sale does not automatically deny the secured creditor the
right to a deficiency claim. Section 8.9-504 of the Code provides
that after notice to a debtor,99 a secured creditor may dispose of
collateral after a default and collect any remaining deficiency that
may then be owed. Where it is established that a secured creditor
has failed to comply with section 8.9-504 of the Code, the debtor
has a right to recover any loss caused by such failure. 1°0 In an ear-
lier decision, the Fourth Circuit had determined that the failure to
give notice to the debtor of a secured party's sale was a fatal defect
that prevented the recovery of a deficiency claim. 101
Two diverging views have been adopted by courts that have ad-
94. 113 Bankr. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
95. 115 Bankr. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
96. The term "disposal income" is defined in § 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code and
generally determines the amount of funds that will be available for unsecured creditors. 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988).
97. Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code presents as a condition of confirmation a re-
quirement that a Chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith. Although "substantial" or
"meaningful" payments is not an absolute requirement in a good faith analysis, it is an
element to be considered. In re Dean, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982).
98. 110 Bankr. 229 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989).
99. The term "debtor" is defined in § 8.9-105 of the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code
and refers to the party obligated to make payment under the secured note. The term should
not be confused with a debtor as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-507(1) (1965).
101. In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973).
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dressed this issue. The first view provides for a "per se" rule that a
secured creditor may not recover a deficiency claim where a debtor
has not been given notice of the secured party's sale.102 The second
view, which has been characterized as the "no harm no foul" rule,
focuses on the actual damage caused to the debtor.10 3 Under the
"no harm no foul rule," the creditor need only establish that the
amount received from the sale of the debtor's collateral is equal to
the fair market value of the collateral. If the creditor can make
such a showing, then the creditor will be entitled to the full
amount of a deficiency claim.10 4
The court in Parrish concluded that Bishop does not mandate
the application of the per se rule in every instance. Instead, the
court found that the "facts of each case must be examined in order
to determine which rule should be applied." -105 Based on the facts
before it, the court held that the debtor had not been damaged by
the lack of notice and found that a deficiency claim should there-
fore be allowed.106 Since Parrish was decided, two Virginia circuit
courts have applied the "no harm no foul" rule.107
D. Entitlement to Priority Claim When Adequate Protection is
Insufficient
The filing of a bankruptcy petition imposes an automatic stay
which prevents a secured creditor from recovering his collateral
without specific court authority.108 A creditor, however, may seek
relief from the automatic stay on the ground that his collateral is
not adequately protected.10 9 A debtor often defends such an action
by providing the creditor with additional protection that is in-
tended to account for any decrease in the collateral that may occur
during the time the automatic stay is in effect.110 In Grundy Na-
102. See In re Parrish, 110 Bankr. at 231.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 232.
105. Id. at 231.
106. Id. at 232.
107. See generally Tazewell Oil Co. v. Miners & Merchants Bank, 19 Va. Cir. 245 (County
of Buchanan Cir. Ct. 1990); Smith v. Paige, 19 Va. Cir. 359 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct.
1990).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
109. Id. § 362(d)(1). Examples of a lack of adequate protection include situations where
the creditor's collateral is depreciating as a result of continued use or declining market
values.
110. Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth different methods by which adequate
protection may be provided. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988).
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tional Bank v. Rife,", the Fourth Circuit determined the relief a
secured creditor gets when the additional protection the creditor
has been given in connection with a relief from stay action proves
to be inadequate.
In Rife, the court held that a creditor is entitled to be treated as
a priority creditor to the extent a debtor fails to make adequate
protection payments. In this case, the debtor was ordered to make
adequate protection payments as a condition to continuing the au-
tomatic stay. The debtor failed to make the necessary payments
and the creditor was unable to obtain the immediate possession of
its collateral. After finally obtaining relief from the automatic stay,
the creditor sought to recover as an administrative priority claim
the payments the debtor failed to make, or, in the alternative, the
depreciation that had occurred to the collateral. 112
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the issue in light of the benefit the
bankruptcy estate received from the use of the creditor's collateral.
Since it was determined that the estate did in fact benefit from the
use of the collateral, the court held that the claim was entitled to
an administrative expense priority equal to the unpaid adequate
protection payments.1 13 In the alternative, the court found that the
creditor could recover the value of the diminution to the collateral.
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
A. Standard of Proof in Dischargeability Actions
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Grogan v. Garner,14 a split existed among the courts of appeal
over the standard of proof to be applied in connection with an ac-
tion brought by a creditor to prevent a claim from being dis-
charged in the debtor's bankruptcy case. In Grogan, the Supreme
Court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard, and
not the clear and convincing evidence standard, should be applied
in determining all instances where a claim can be excepted from a
111. 876 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 364.
113. The court relied on §§ 507(b) and 503(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as authority for
granting the creditor a priority claim. These Code sections set forth the administrative ex-
penses and the priority claims available in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 363-64.
114. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991). Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the situa-
tions in which a creditor can seek to have his claim determined not to be discharged in a
debtor's bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
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debtor's discharge.115 The Supreme Court's decision effectively af-
firms the Fourth Circuit's prior rulings in this area.116 Although
Grogan does not specifically address the standard of proof to be
used in connection with an action objecting to a debtor's general
discharge, 117 bankruptcy courts in Virginia have traditionally ap-
plied the same standard used in an action objecting to the dis-
charge of an individual claim. '
B. Dischargeability of Claims Resulting from a Debtor Driving
While Intoxicated
Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a claim
resulting from the operation of a vehicle by a debtor while intoxi-
cated can be excepted from discharge."'9 Previously under this
statute it was unclear whether a claimant had to obtain a judgment
or decree against a debtor before the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion to preserve the right to object to the dischargeability of the
claim. In 1990, Congress amended the statute to clarify its applica-
tion. As amended, the section now excepts from discharge any debt
"for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor
was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug or another sub-
stance.1 20 As a result of the amendment, the statute now expressly
includes drug induced intoxication and limits the scope of the ex-
ception to claims arising from death or personal injury.2 ' A sepa-
rate amendment to the Bankruptcy Code has also been adopted
that applies this exception from discharge to a Chapter 13
debtor. 122
115. 111 S. Ct. at 660.
116. See generally Whitson v. Middleton, 898 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1990); Combs v. Rich-
ardson, 838 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1988).
117. An action objecting to a debtor's discharge is distinguishable from an action ob-
jecting to the discharge of an individual debt. An action objecting to a debtor's discharge is
brought under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code and it affects all debts of the debtor. In con-
trast, an action objecting to an individual debt is raised under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code and is limited to a specific claim. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 727 (1988).
118. In re Harlow, 107 Bankr. 528, 531 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989); In re Parker, 85 Bankr.
384, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1328(a)(2).
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C. Dischargeability of Student Loans
The definition of student loans under section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code has been broadened to include "an educational
benefit over payment" and "an obligation to repay funds received
as a educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.' 1 23 The time pe-
riod in which the loan must have first become due in order to be
excepted from a discharge has also been extended from five to
seven years.12 4 A further amendment to the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that for the first time the student loan exception to a
debtor's discharge will apply to the discharge received by a Chap-
ter 13 debtor. 125
123. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
124. Id. § 523(a)(8)(A).
125. Id. § 1328(a)(2).
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